

Each normal logic program has a 2-valued Minimal Hypotheses semantics

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Abstract. In this paper we explore a unifying approach — that of hypotheses assumption — as a means to provide a semantics for all Normal Logic Programs (NLPs), the Minimal Hypotheses (MH) semantics¹. This semantics takes a positive hypotheses assumption approach as a means to guarantee the desirable properties of model existence, relevance and cumulativity, and of generalizing the Stable Models semantics in the process. To do so we first introduce the fundamental semantic concept of minimality of assumed positive hypotheses, define the MH semantics, and analyze the semantics’ properties and applicability. Indeed, abductive Logic Programming can be conceptually captured by a strategy centered on the assumption of abducibles (or hypotheses). Likewise, the Argumentation perspective of Logic Programs (e.g. [7]) also lends itself to an arguments (or hypotheses) assumption approach. Previous works on Abduction (e.g. [12]) have depicted the atoms of default negated literals in NLPs as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses. We take a complementary and more general view than these works to NLP semantics by employing positive hypotheses instead.

Keywords: Hypotheses, Semantics, NLPs, Abduction, Argumentation.

1 Background

Logic Programs have long been used in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.

Definition 1. Normal Logic Program. *By an alphabet \mathcal{A} of a language \mathcal{L} we mean (finite or countably infinite) disjoint sets of constants, predicate symbols, and function symbols, with at least one constant. In addition, any alphabet is assumed to contain a countably infinite set of distinguished variable symbols. A term over \mathcal{A} is defined recursively as either a variable, a constant or an expression of the form $f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ where f is a function symbol of \mathcal{A} , n its arity, and the t_i are terms. An atom over \mathcal{A} is an expression of the form $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ where P is a predicate symbol of \mathcal{A} , and the t_i are terms. A literal is either an atom A or its default negation $\text{not } A$. We dub default literals (or default negated literals — DNLs, for short) those of the form $\text{not } A$. A term (resp. atom, literal) is said ground if it does not contain variables. The set of all ground terms (resp. atoms) of \mathcal{A} is called the Herbrand universe (resp. base) of \mathcal{A} . For short we use \mathcal{H} to denote the Herbrand base of \mathcal{A} . A Normal Logic Program (NLP) is a possibly infinite set of rules (with no infinite descending chains of syntactical dependency) of the form*

$$H \leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n, \text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_m, \text{ (with } m, n \geq 0 \text{ and finite)}$$

where H , the B_i and the C_j are atoms, and each rule stands for all its ground instances. In conformity with the standard convention, we write rules of the form $H \leftarrow$ also simply as H (known as “facts”). An NLP P is called definite if none of its rules contain default literals. H is the head of the rule r , denoted by $\text{head}(r)$, and $\text{body}(r)$ denotes the set $\{B_1, \dots, B_n, \text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_m\}$ of all the literals in the body of r .

When doing problem modelling with logic programs, rules of the form

$$\perp \leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n, \text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_m, \text{ (with } m, n \geq 0 \text{ and finite)}$$

¹ This paper is a very condensed summary of some of the main contributions of the PhD Thesis [19] of the first author, supported by FCT-MCTES grant SFRH / BD / 28761 / 2006, and supervised by the second author.

with a non-empty body are known as a type of Integrity Constraints (ICs), specifically *denials*, and they are normally used to prune out unwanted candidate solutions. We abuse the ‘not’ default negation notation applying it to non-empty sets of literals too: we write $\text{not } S$ to denote $\{\text{not } s : s \in S\}$, and confound $\text{not not } a \equiv a$. When S is an arbitrary, non-empty set of literals $S = \{B_1, \dots, B_n, \text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_m\}$ we use

- S^+ denotes the set $\{B_1, \dots, B_n\}$ of positive literals in S
- S^- denotes the set $\{\text{not } C_1, \dots, \text{not } C_m\}$ of negative literals in S
- $|S| = S^+ \cup (\text{not } S^-)$ denotes the set $\{B_1, \dots, B_n, C_1, \dots, C_m\}$ of atoms of S

As expected, we say a set of literals S is consistent iff $S^+ \cap |S^-| = \emptyset$. We also write $\text{heads}(P)$ to denote the set of heads of non-IC rules of a (possibly constrained) program P , i.e., $\text{heads}(P) = \{\text{head}(r) : r \in P\} \setminus \{\perp\}$, and $\text{facts}(P)$ to denote the set of facts of P — $\text{facts}(P) = \{\text{head}(r) : r \in P \wedge \text{body}(r) = \emptyset\}$.

Definition 2. Part of body of a rule not in loop. Let P be an NLP and r a rule of P . We write $\overline{\text{body}(r)}$ to denote the subset of $\text{body}(r)$ whose atoms do not depend on r . Formally, $\overline{\text{body}(r)}$ is the largest set of literals such that

$$\overline{\text{body}(r)} \subseteq \text{body}(r) \wedge \forall_{a \in \overline{\text{body}(r)}} \nexists_{r_a \in P} (\text{head}(r_a) = a \wedge r_a \leftarrow r)$$

where $r_a \leftarrow r$ means rule r_a depends on rule r , i.e., either $\text{head}(r) \in |\text{body}(r_a)|$ or there is some other rule $r' \in P$ such that $r_a \leftarrow r'$ and $\text{head}(r) \in |\text{body}(r')|$.

Definition 3. Layer Supported and Classically supported interpretations. We say an interpretation I of an NLP P is layer (classically) supported iff every atom a of I is layer (classically) supported in I . a is layer (classically) supported in I iff there is some rule r in P with $\text{head}(r) = a$ such that $I \models \overline{\text{body}(r)}$ ($I \models \text{body}(r)$). Likewise, we say the rule r is layer (classically) supported in I iff $I \models \overline{\text{body}(r)}$ ($I \models \text{body}(r)$).

Literals in $\overline{\text{body}(r)}$ are, by definition, not in loop with r . The notion of layered support requires that all such literals be true under I in order for $\text{head}(r)$ to be layer supported in I . Hence, if $\overline{\text{body}(r)}$ is empty, $\text{head}(r)$ is *ipso facto* layer supported.

Proposition 1. Classical Support implies Layered Support. Given a NLP P , an interpretation I , and an atom a such that $a \in I$, if a is classically supported in I then a is also layer supported in I .

Proof. Knowing that, by definition, $\overline{\text{body}(r)} \subseteq \text{body}(r)$ for every rule r , it follows trivially that a is layer supported in I if a is classically supported in I . \square

2 Motivation

“Why the need for another 2-valued semantics for NLPs since we already have the Stable Models one?” The question has its merit since the Stable Models (SMs) semantics [9] is exactly what is necessary for so many problem solving issues, but the answer to it is best understood when we ask it the other way around: “Is there any situation where the SMs semantics does not provide all the intended models?” and “Is there any 2-valued generalization of SMs that keeps the intended models it does provide, adds the missing intended ones, and also enjoys the useful properties of guarantee of model existence, relevance, and cumulativity?”

Example 1. A Joint Vacation Problem — Merging Logic Programs. Three friends are planning a joint vacation. First friend says “If we don’t go to the mountains, then we should go to the beach”. The second friend says “If we don’t go to travelling, then we should go to the mountains”. The third friend says “If we don’t go to the beach, then we should go travelling”. We code this information as the following NLP:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{beach} &\leftarrow \text{not mountain} \\ \text{mountain} &\leftarrow \text{not travel} \\ \text{travel} &\leftarrow \text{not beach} \end{aligned}$$

Each of these individual consistent rules come from a different friend. According to the SMs, each friend had a “solution” (a SM) for his own rule, but when we put the three rules together, because they form an odd loop over negation (OLON), the resulting merged logic program has no SM. If we assume *beach* is *true* then we cannot conclude *travel* and therefore we conclude *mountain* is also *true* — this gives rise to the $\{beach, mountain, not\ travel\}$ joint and multi-place vacation solution. The other (symmetric) two are $\{mountain, not\ beach, travel\}$ and $\{travel, not\ mountain, beach\}$. This example too shows the importance of having a 2-valued semantics guaranteeing model existence, in this case for the sake of arbitrary merging of logic programs (and for the sake of existence of a joint vacation for these three friends).

Increased Declarativity. An IC is a rule whose head is \perp , and although such syntactical definition of IC is generally accepted as standard, the SM semantics can employ odd loops over negation, such as the $a \leftarrow not\ a, X$ to act as ICs, thereby mixing and unnecessarily confounding two distinct Knowledge Representation issues: the one of IC use, and the one of assigning semantics to loops. For the sake of declarativity, rules with \perp head should be the only way to write ICs in a LP: no rule, or combination of rules, with head different from \perp should possibly act as IC(s) under any given semantics. It is commonly argued that answer sets (or stable models) of a program correspond to the solutions of the corresponding problem, so no answer set means no solution. We argue against this position: “normal” logic rules (i.e., non-ICs) should be used to shape the candidate-solution space, whereas ICs, and ICs alone, should be allowed to play the role of cutting down the undesired candidate-solutions. In this regard, an IC-free NLP should always have a model; if some problem modelled as an NLP with ICs has no solution (i.e., no model) that should be due only to the ICs, not to the “normal” rules.

Argumentation From an argumentation perspective, the author of [7], states:

“Stable extensions do not capture the intuitive semantics of every meaningful argumentation system.”

where the “stable extensions” have a 1-to-1 correspondence to the SMs ([7]), and also

“Let P be a knowledge base represented either as a logic program, or as a nonmonotonic theory or as an argumentation framework. Then there is not necessarily a “bug” in P if P has no stable semantics.

This theorem defeats an often held opinion in the logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning community that if a logic program or a nonmonotonic theory has no stable semantics then there is something “wrong” in it.”

Thus, a criterion different from the *stability* one must be used in order to effectively model every argumentation framework adequately.

Arbitrary Updates and/or Merges One of the main goals behind the conception of non-monotonic logics was the ability to deal with the changing, evolving, updating of knowledge. There are scenarios where it is possible and useful to combine several Knowledge Bases (possibly from different authors or sources) into a single one, and/or to update a given KB with new knowledge. Assuming the KBs are coded as IC-free NLPs, as well as the updates, the resulting KB is also an IC-free NLP. In such a case, the resulting (merged and/or updated) KB should always have a semantics. This should be true particularly in the case of NLPs where no negations are allowed in the heads of rules. In this case no contradictions can arise because there are no conflicting rule heads. The lack of such guarantee when the underlying semantics used is the Stable Models, for example, compromises the possibility of arbitrarily updating and/or merging KBs (coded as IC-free NLPs). In the case of self-updating programs, the desirable “liveness” property is put into question, even without outside intervention.

These motivational issues raise the questions “Which should be the 2-valued models of an NLP when it has no SMs?”, “How do these relate to SMs?”, “Is there a uniform approach to characterize both such models and the SMs?”, and “Is there any 2-valued generalization of the SMs that encompasses the intuitive semantics of every logic program?”. Answering such questions is a paramount motivation and thrust in this paper.

2.1 Intuitively Desired Semantics

It is commonly accepted that the non-stratification of the default *not* is the fundamental ingredient which allows for the possibility of existence of several models for a program. The non-stratified DNLs (i.e., in a loop) of a program can thus be seen as non-deterministically assumable choices. The rules in the program, as well as the particular semantics we wish to assign them, is what constrains which sets of those choices we take as acceptable. Programs with OLONs (ex. 1) are said to be “contradictory” by the SMs community because the latter takes a negative hypotheses assumption approach, consistently maximizing them, i.e., DNLs are seen as assumable/abducible hypotheses. In ex.1 though, assuming whichever maximal negative hypotheses leads to a positive contradictory conclusion via the rules. On the other hand, if we take a consistent minimal *positive* hypotheses assumption (where the assumed hypotheses are the *atoms* of the DNLs), then it is impossible to achieve a contradiction since no negative conclusions can be drawn from NLP rules. Minimizing positive assumptions implies the maximizing of negative ones but gaining an extra degree of freedom.

2.2 Desirable Formal Properties

Only ICs (rules with \perp head) should “endanger” model existence in a logic program. Therefore, a semantics for NLPs with no ICs should guarantee model existence (which, e.g., does not occur with SMs). Relevance is also a useful property since it allows the development of top-down query-driven proof-procedures that allow for the sound and complete search for answers to a user’s query. This is useful in the sense that in order to find an answer to a query only the relevant part of the program must be considered, whereas with a non-relevant semantics the whole program must be considered, with corresponding performance disadvantage compared to a relevant semantics.

Definition 4. *Relevant part of P for atom a.* The relevant part of NLP P for atom a is

$$Rel_P(a) = \{r_a \in P : head(r_a) = a\} \cup \{r \in P : \exists r_a \in P \wedge head(r_a) = a \wedge r \leftarrow r_a\}$$

Definition 5. *Relevance (adapted from [5]).* A semantics Sem for logic programs is said Relevant iff for every program P

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{H}_P (\forall M \in Models_{Sem}(P) a \in M) \Leftrightarrow (\forall M_a \in Models_{Sem}(Rel_P(a)) a \in M_a)$$

Moreover, cumulativity also plays a role in performance enhancement in the sense that only a semantics enjoying this property can take advantage of storing intermediate lemmas to speed up future computations.

Definition 6. *Cumulativity (adapted from [4]).* Let P be an NLP, and a, b two atoms of \mathcal{H}_P . A semantics Sem is Cumulative iff the semantics of P remains unchanged when any atom true in the semantics is added to P as a fact:

$$\forall a, b \in \mathcal{H}_P ((\forall M \in Models_{Sem}(P) a \in M) \Rightarrow (\forall M \in Models_{Sem}(P) b \in M \Leftrightarrow \forall M_a \in Models_{Sem}(P \cup \{a\}) b \in M_a))$$

Finally, each individual SM of a program, by being minimal and classically supported, should be accepted as a model according to every 2-valued semantics, and hence every 2-valued semantics should be a model conservative extension of Stable Models.

3 Syntactic Transformations

It is commonly accepted that definite LPs (i.e., without default negation) have only one 2-valued model — its *least model* which coincides with the Well-Founded Model (WFM [8]). This is also the case for locally stratified LPs. In such cases we can use a syntactic transformation on a program to obtain that model. In [2] the author defined the program Remainder (denoted by \hat{P}) for calculating the WFM, which coincides with the unique perfect model for locally stratified LPs. The Remainder can thus be seen as a generalization for NLPs of the *lfp(T)*, the latter obtainable only from the subclass of definite LPs. We recap here the definitions necessary for the Remainder because we will use it in the definition of our Minimal Hypotheses

semantics. The intuitive gist of MH semantics (formally defined in section 4) is as follows: an interpretation M_H is a MH model of program P iff there is some minimal set of hypotheses H such that the truth-values of all atoms of P become determined assuming the atoms in H as *true*. We resort to the program Remainder as a deterministic (and efficient, i.e., computable in polynomial time) means to find out if the truth-values of all literals became determined or not — we will see below how the Remainder can be used to find this out.

3.1 Program Remainder

For self-containment, we include here the definitions of [2] upon which the Remainder relies, and adapt them where convenient to better match the syntactic conventions used throughout this paper.

Definition 7. Program transformation (def. 4.2 of [2]). A program transformation is a relation \mapsto between ground logic programs. A semantics S allows a transformation \mapsto iff $Models_S(P_1) = Models_S(P_2)$ for all P_1 and P_2 with $P_1 \mapsto P_2$. We write \mapsto^* to denote the fixed point of the \mapsto operation, i.e., $P \mapsto^* P'$ where $\nexists_{P'' \neq P'} P' \mapsto P''$. It follows that $P \mapsto^* P' \Rightarrow P' \mapsto P'$.

Definition 8. Positive reduction (def. 4.6 of [2]). Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by positive reduction ($P_1 \mapsto_P P_2$) iff there is a rule $r \in P_1$ and a negative literal $not\ b \in body(r)$ such that $b \notin heads(P_1)$, i.e., there is no rule for b in P_1 , and $P_2 = (P_1 \setminus \{r\}) \cup \{head(r) \leftarrow (body(r) \setminus \{not\ b\})\}$.

Definition 9. Negative reduction (def. 4.7 of [2]). Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by negative reduction ($P_1 \mapsto_N P_2$) iff there is a rule $r \in P_1$ and a negative literal $not\ b \in body(r)$ such that $b \in facts(P_1)$, i.e., b appears as a fact in P_1 , and $P_2 = P_1 \setminus \{r\}$.

Negative reduction is consistent with classical support, but not with the layered one. Therefore, we introduce now a layered version of the negative reduction operation.

Definition 10. Layered negative reduction. Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by layered negative reduction ($P_1 \mapsto_{LN} P_2$) iff there is a rule $r \in P_1$ and a negative literal $not\ b \in \overline{body(r)}$ such that $b \in facts(P_1)$, i.e., b appears as a fact in P_1 , and $P_2 = P_1 \setminus \{r\}$.

The Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) of rules of a program can be calculated in polynomial time [20]. Once the SCCs of rules have been identified, the $\overline{body(r)}$ subset of $body(r)$, for each rule r , is identifiable in linear time — one needs to check just once for each literal in $body(r)$ if it is also in $\overline{body(r)}$. Therefore, these polynomial time complexity operations are all the added complexity Layered negative reduction adds over regular Negative reduction.

Definition 11. Success (def. 5.2 of [2]). Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by success ($P_1 \mapsto_S P_2$) iff there are a rule $r \in P_1$ and a fact $b \in facts(P_1)$ such that $b \in body(r)$, and $P_2 = (P_1 \setminus \{r\}) \cup \{head(r) \leftarrow (body(r) \setminus \{b\})\}$.

Definition 12. Failure (def. 5.3 of [2]). Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by failure ($P_1 \mapsto_F P_2$) iff there are a rule $r \in P_1$ and a positive literal $b \in body(r)$ such that $b \notin heads(P_1)$, i.e., there are no rules for b in P_1 , and $P_2 = P_1 \setminus \{r\}$.

Definition 13. Loop detection (def. 5.10 of [2]). Let P_1 and P_2 be ground programs. Program P_2 results from P_1 by loop detection ($P_1 \mapsto_L P_2$) iff there is a set \mathcal{A} of ground atoms such that

1. for each rule $r \in P_1$, if $head(r) \in \mathcal{A}$, then $body(r) \cap \mathcal{A} \neq \emptyset$,
2. $P_2 := \{r \in P_1 \mid body(r) \cap \mathcal{A} = \emptyset\}$,
3. $P_1 \neq P_2$.

We are not entering here into the details of the *loop detection* step, but just taking note that 1) such a set \mathcal{A} corresponds to an unfounded set (cf. [8]); 2) loop detection is computationally equivalent to finding the SCCs [20], and is known to be of polynomial time complexity; and 3) the atoms in the unfounded set \mathcal{A} have all their corresponding rules involved in SCCs where all heads of rules in loop appear positive in the bodies of the rules in loop.

Definition 14. Reduction (def. 5.15 of [2]).

Let \mapsto_X denote the rewriting system: $\mapsto_X := \mapsto_P \cup \mapsto_N \cup \mapsto_S \cup \mapsto_F \cup \mapsto_L$.

Definition 15. Layered reduction.

Let \mapsto_{LX} denote the rewriting system: $\mapsto_{LX} := \mapsto_P \cup \mapsto_{LN} \cup \mapsto_S \cup \mapsto_F \cup \mapsto_L$.

Definition 16. Remainder (def. 5.17 of [2]). Let P be a program. Let \hat{P} satisfy $\text{ground}(P) \mapsto_X^* \hat{P}$. Then \hat{P} is called the remainder of P , and is guaranteed to exist and to be unique to P . Moreover, the calculus of \mapsto_X^* is known to be of polynomial time complexity [2]. When convenient, we write $\text{Rem}(P)$ instead of \hat{P} .

An important result from [2] is that the WFM of P is such that $WFM^+(P) = \text{facts}(\hat{P})$, $WFM^{+u} = \text{heads}(\hat{P})$, and $WFM^-(P) = \mathcal{H}_P \setminus WFM^{+u}(P)$, where $WFM^+(P)$ denotes the set of atoms of P true in the WFM, $WFM^{+u}(P)$ denotes the set of atoms of P true or undefined in the WFM, and $WFM^-(P)$ denotes the set of atoms of P false in the WFM.

Definition 17. Layered Remainder. Let P be a program. Let the program \dot{P} satisfy $\text{ground}(P) \mapsto_{LX}^* \dot{P}$. Then \dot{P} is called a layered remainder of P . Since \dot{P} is equivalent to \hat{P} , apart from the difference between \mapsto_{LN} and \mapsto_N , it is trivial that \dot{P} is also guaranteed to exist and to be unique for P . Moreover, the calculus of \mapsto_{LX}^* is likewise of polynomial time complexity because \mapsto_{LN} is also of polynomial time complexity.

The remainder's rewrite rules are provably confluent, ie. independent of application order. The layered remainder's rules differ only in the negative reduction rule and the confluence proof of the former is readily adapted to the latter.

Example 2. \dot{P} versus \hat{P} . Recall the program from example 1 but now with an additional fourth stubborn friend who insists on going to the beach no matter what. $P =$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{beach} \leftarrow \text{not mountain} \\ & \text{mountain} \leftarrow \text{not travel} \\ & \text{travel} \leftarrow \text{not beach} \\ & \text{beach} \end{aligned}$$

We can clearly see that the single fact rule does not depend on any other, and that the remaining three rules forming the loop all depend on each other and on the fact rule *beach*. \hat{P} is the fixed point of \mapsto_X , i.e., the fixed point of $\mapsto_P \cup \mapsto_N \cup \mapsto_S \cup \mapsto_F \cup \mapsto_L$. Since *beach* is a fact, the \mapsto_N transformation deletes the *travel* \leftarrow *not beach* rule; i.e., $P \mapsto_N P'$ is such that

$$P' = \{\text{beach} \leftarrow \text{not mountain} \quad \text{mountain} \leftarrow \text{not travel} \quad \text{beach} \leftarrow\}$$

Now in P' there are no rules for *travel* and hence we can apply the \mapsto_P transformation which deletes the *not travel* from the body of *mountain*'s rule; i.e, $P' \mapsto_P P''$ where $P'' = \{\text{beach} \leftarrow \text{not mountain} \quad \text{mountain} \leftarrow \quad \text{beach} \leftarrow\}$

Finally, in P'' *mountain* is a fact and hence we can again apply the \mapsto_N obtaining $P'' \mapsto_N P'''$ where $P''' = \{\text{mountain} \leftarrow \quad \text{beach} \leftarrow\}$ upon which no more transformations can be applied, so $\hat{P} = P'''$. Instead, $\dot{P} = P$ is the fixed point of \mapsto_{LX} , i.e., the fixed point of $\mapsto_P \cup \mapsto_{LN} \cup \mapsto_S \cup \mapsto_F \cup \mapsto_L$.

4 Minimal Hypotheses Semantics

4.1 Choosing Hypotheses

The abductive perspective of [12] depicts the atoms of DNLs as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses. Atoms of DNLs can be considered as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses, but not all of them. When we have a locally stratified program we cannot really say there is any degree of freedom in assuming truth values for the atoms of the program's DNLs. So, we realize that only the atoms of DNLs involved in SCCs² are eligible to be considered further assumable hypotheses.

² Strongly Connected Components, as in Examples 1 and 2

Both the SMs and the approach of [12], when taking the abductive perspective, adopt negative hypotheses only. This approach works fine for some instances of non-well-founded negation such as loops (in particular, for even loops over negation like this one), but not for odd loops over negation like, e.g. $a \leftarrow \text{not } a$: assuming *not a* would lead to the conclusion that *a* is *true* which contradicts the initial assumption. To overcome this problem, we generalized the hypotheses assumption perspective to allow the adoption, not only of negative hypotheses, but also of positive ones. Having taken this generalization step we realized that positive hypotheses assumption alone is sufficient to address all situations, i.e., there is no need for both positive and negative hypotheses assumption. Indeed, because we minimize the positive hypotheses we are with one stroke maximizing the negative ones, which has been the traditional way of dealing with the CWA, and also with stable models because the latter's requirement of classical support minimizes models.

In example 1 we saw three solutions, each assuming as *true* one of the DNLs in the loop. Adding a fourth stubborn friend insisting on going to the beach, as in example 2, should still permit the two solutions $\{\text{beach}, \text{mountain}, \text{not travel}\}$ and $\{\text{travel}, \text{not mountain}, \text{beach}\}$. The only way to permit both these solutions is by resorting to the Layered Remainder, and not to the Remainder, as a means to identify the set of assumable hypotheses.

Thus, all the literals of P that are not determined *false* in \hat{P} are candidates for the role of hypotheses we may consider to assume as *true*. Merging this perspective with the abductive perspective of [12] (where the DNLs are the abducibles) we come to the following definition of the Hypotheses set of a program.

Definition 18. Hypotheses set of a program. *Let P be an NLP. We write $Hyps(P)$ to denote the set of assumable hypotheses of P : the atoms that appear as DNLs in the bodies of rules of \hat{P} . Formally, $Hyps(P) = \{a : \exists_{r \in \hat{P}} \text{not } a \in \text{body}(r)\}$.*

One can define a classical support compatible version of the Hypotheses set of a program, only using to that effect the Remainder instead of the Layered Remainder. I.e.,

Definition 19. Classical Hypotheses set of a program. *Let P be an NLP. We write $CHyps(P)$ to denote the set of assumable hypotheses of P consistent with the classical notion of support: the atoms that appear as DNLs in the bodies of rules of \hat{P} . Formally, $CHyps(P) = \{a : \exists_{r \in \hat{P}} \text{not } a \in \text{body}(r)\}$.*

Here we take the layered support compatible approach and, therefore, we will use the Hypotheses set as in definition 18. Since $CHyps(P) \subseteq Hyps(P)$ for every NLP P , there is no generality loss in using $Hyps(P)$ instead of $CHyps(P)$, while using $Hyps(P)$ allows for some useful semantics properties examined in the sequel.

4.2 Definition

Intuitively, a Minimal Hypotheses model of a program is obtained from a minimal set of hypotheses which is sufficiently large to determine the truth-value of all literals via Remainder.

Definition 20. Minimal Hypotheses model. *Let P be an NLP. Let $Hyps(P)$ be the set of assumable hypotheses of P (cf. definition 18), and H some subset of $Hyps(P)$.*

A 2-valued model M of P is a Minimal Hypotheses model of P iff

$$M^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H})$$

where $H = \emptyset$ or H is non-empty set-inclusion minimal (the set-inclusion minimality is considered only for non-empty H s). I.e., the hypotheses set H is minimal but sufficient to determine (via Remainder) the truth-value of all literals in the program.

We already know that $WFM^+(P) = \text{facts}(\hat{P})$ and that $WFM^{+u}(P) = \text{heads}(\hat{P})$. Thus, whenever $\text{facts}(\hat{P}) = \text{heads}(\hat{P})$ we have $WFM^+(P) = WFM^{+u}(P)$ which means $WFM^u(P) = \emptyset$. Moreover, whenever $WFM^u(P) = \emptyset$ we know, by Corollary 5.6 of [8], that the 2-valued model M such that $M^+ = \text{facts}(\hat{P})$ is the unique stable model of P . Thus, we conclude that, as an alternative equivalent definition,

M is a Minimal Hypotheses model of P iff M is a stable model of $P \cup H$ where H is empty or a non-empty set-inclusion minimal subset of $Hyps(P)$. Moreover, it follows immediately that every SM of P is a Minimal Hypotheses model of P .

In example 2 we can thus see that we have the two models $\{beach, mountain, not\ travel\}$ and $\{travel, beach, not\ mountain\}$. This is the case because the addition of the fourth stubborn friend does not change the set of $Hyps(P)$ which is based upon the Layered Remainder, and not on the Remainder.

Example 3. Minimal Hypotheses models for the vacation with passport variation. Consider again the vacation problem from example 1 with a variation including the need for valid passports for travelling $P =$

$$\begin{aligned} beach &\leftarrow not\ mountain \\ mountain &\leftarrow not\ travel \\ travel &\leftarrow not\ beach, not\ expired_passport \\ \\ passport_ok &\leftarrow not\ expired_passport \\ expired_passport &\leftarrow not\ passport_ok \end{aligned}$$

We have $P = \dot{P} = \hat{P}$ and thus $Hyps(P) = \{beach, mountain, travel, passport_ok, expired_passport\}$. Let us see which are the MH models for this program.

$H = \emptyset$ does not yield a MH model.

Assuming $H = \{beach\}$ we have $P \cup H = P \cup \{beach\} =$

$$\begin{aligned} beach &\leftarrow not\ mountain \\ mountain &\leftarrow not\ travel \\ travel &\leftarrow not\ beach, not\ expired_passport \\ beach & \\ passport_ok &\leftarrow not\ expired_passport \\ expired_passport &\leftarrow not\ passport_ok \end{aligned}$$

and $\widehat{P \cup H} =$

$$\begin{aligned} &mountain \\ &beach \\ passport_ok &\leftarrow not\ expired_passport \\ expired_passport &\leftarrow not\ passport_ok \end{aligned}$$

which means $H = \{beach\}$ is not sufficient to determine the truth values of all literals of P . One can easily see that the same happens for $H = \{mountain\}$ and for $H = \{travel\}$: in either case the literals $passport_ok$ and $expired_passport$ remain non-determined.

If we assume $H = \{expired_passport\}$ then $P \cup H$ is

$$\begin{aligned} beach &\leftarrow not\ mountain \\ mountain &\leftarrow not\ travel \\ travel &\leftarrow not\ beach, not\ expired_passport \\ \\ passport_ok &\leftarrow not\ expired_passport \\ expired_passport &\leftarrow not\ passport_ok \\ expired_passport & \end{aligned}$$

and $\widehat{P \cup H} =$

$$\begin{aligned} &mountain \\ &expired_passport \end{aligned}$$

which means $M_{expired_passport}^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup H}) = \{mountain, expired_passport\}$, i.e.,

$M_{expired_passport} = \{not\ beach, mountain, not\ travel, not\ passport_ok, expired_passport\}$, is a MH

model of P . Since assuming $H = \{\text{expired_passport}\}$ alone is sufficient to determine all literals, there is no other set of hypotheses H' of P such that $H' \supset \{\text{expired_passport}\}$ (notice the *strict* \supset , not \supseteq), yielding a MH model of P . E.g., $H' = \{\text{travel}, \text{expired_passport}\}$ does not lead to a MH model of P simply because H' is not minimal w.r.t. $H = \{\text{expired_passport}\}$.
 If we assume $H = \{\text{passport_ok}\}$ then $P \cup H$ is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{beach} &\leftarrow \text{not mountain} \\ \text{mountain} &\leftarrow \text{not travel} \\ \text{travel} &\leftarrow \text{not beach, not expired_passport} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{passport_ok} &\leftarrow \text{not expired_passport} \\ \text{expired_passport} &\leftarrow \text{not passport_ok} \\ \text{passport_ok} & \end{aligned}$$

and $\widehat{P \cup H} =$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{beach} &\leftarrow \text{not mountain} \\ \text{mountain} &\leftarrow \text{not travel} \\ \text{travel} &\leftarrow \text{not beach} \\ \text{passport_ok} & \end{aligned}$$

which, apart from the fact passport_ok , corresponds to the original version of this example and still leaves literals with non-determined truth-values. I.e., assuming the passports are OK allows for the three possibilities of example 1 but it is not enough to entirely “solve” the vacation problem: we need some hypotheses set containing one of beach , mountain , or travel if (in this case, *and only if*) it also contains passport_ok .

Example 4. Minimality of Hypotheses does not guarantee minimality of model. Let P , with no SMs, be

$$\begin{aligned} a &\leftarrow \text{not } b, c \\ b &\leftarrow \text{not } c, \text{not } a \\ c &\leftarrow \text{not } a, b \end{aligned}$$

In this case $P = \widehat{P} = \overset{\circ}{P}$, which makes $\text{Hyps}(P) = \{a, b, c\}$.

$H = \emptyset$ does not determine all literals of P because $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \emptyset}) = \text{facts}(\widehat{P}) = \emptyset$ and $\text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup \emptyset}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P}) = \{a, b, c\}$.

$H = \{a\}$ does determine all literals of P because $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{a\}}) = \{a\}$ and $\text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup \{a\}}) = \{a\}$, thus yielding the MH model M_a such that $M_a^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{a\}}) = \{a\}$, i.e., $M_a = \{a, \text{not } b, \text{not } c\}$.

$H = \{c\}$ is also a minimal set of hypotheses determining all literals because $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{c\}}) = \{a, c\}$ and $\text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup \{c\}}) = \{a, c\}$, thus yielding the MH model M_c of P such that $M_c^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{c\}}) = \{a, c\}$, i.e., $M_c = \{a, \text{not } b, c\}$. However, M_c is not a minimal model of P because $M_c^+ = \{a, c\}$ is a strict superset of $M_a^+ = \{a\}$. M_c is indeed an MH model of P , but just not a minimal model thereby being a clear example of how minimality of hypotheses does not entail minimality of consequences. Just to make

this example complete, we show that $H = \{b\}$ also determines all literals of P because $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{b\}}) = \{b, c\}$ and $\text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup \{b\}}) = \{b, c\}$, thus yielding the MH model M_b such that $M_b^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup \{b\}}) = \{b, c\}$, i.e., $M_b = \{\text{not } a, b, c\}$. Any other hypotheses set is necessarily a strict superset of either $H = \{a\}$, $H = \{b\}$, or $H = \{c\}$ and, therefore, not set-inclusion minimal; i.e., there are no more MH models of P .

Also, not all minimal models of a program are MH models, as the following example shows.

Example 5. Some minimal models are not Minimal Hypotheses models. Let P (with no SMs) be

$$\begin{aligned} a &\leftarrow k \\ k &\leftarrow \text{not } t \\ t &\leftarrow a, b \\ a &\leftarrow \text{not } b \\ b &\leftarrow \text{not } a \end{aligned}$$

In this case $P = \widehat{P} = \dot{P}$ and therefore $Hyps(P) = \{a, b, t\}$. Since $facts(\widehat{P}) \neq heads(\widehat{P})$, the hypotheses set $H = \emptyset$ does not yield a MH model. Assuming $H = \{a\}$ we have $\widehat{P \cup H} = \widehat{P \cup \{a\}} = \{a \leftarrow , k \leftarrow\}$ so, $\widehat{P \cup H}$ is the set of facts $\{a, k\}$ and, therefore, M_a such that $M_a^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = facts(\widehat{P \cup \{a\}}) = \{a, k\}$, is a MH model of P . Assuming $H = \{b\}$ we have $\widehat{P \cup \{b\}} =$

$$\begin{aligned} a &\leftarrow k \\ k &\leftarrow not\ t \\ t &\leftarrow a \\ b &\leftarrow not\ a \\ b \end{aligned}$$

thus $facts(\widehat{P \cup \{b\}}) = \{b\} \neq heads(\widehat{P \cup \{b\}}) = \{a, b, t, k\}$, which means the set of hypotheses $H = \{b\}$ does not yield a MH model of P . Assuming $H = \{t\}$ we have $\widehat{P \cup \{t\}} =$

$$\begin{aligned} t &\leftarrow a, b \\ b &\leftarrow not\ a \\ a &\leftarrow not\ b \\ t \end{aligned}$$

thus $facts(\widehat{P \cup \{t\}}) = \{t\} \neq heads(\widehat{P \cup \{t\}}) = \{a, b, t\}$, which means the set of hypotheses $H = \{t\}$ does not yield a MH model of P .

Since we already know that $H = \{a\}$ yields an MH model M_a with $M_a^+ = \{a, k\}$, there is no point in trying out any subset H' of $Hyps(P) = \{a, b, t\}$ such that $a \in H'$ because any such subset would not be minimal w.r.t. $H = \{a\}$. Let us, therefore, move on to the unique subset left: $H = \{b, t\}$. Assuming $H = \{b, t\}$ we have $\widehat{P \cup \{b, t\}} = \{t \leftarrow , b \leftarrow\}$ thus $facts(\widehat{P \cup \{b, t\}}) = \{b, t\} = heads(\widehat{P \cup \{b, t\}})$, which means $M_{b,t}$ such that $M_{b,t}^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = facts(\widehat{P \cup \{b, t\}}) = \{b, t\}$, is a MH model of P . It is important to remark that this program has other classical models, e.g. $\{a, k\}$, $\{b, t\}$, and $\{a, t\}$, but only the first two are Minimal Hypotheses models — $\{a, t\}$ is obtainable only via the set of hypotheses $\{a, t\}$ which is non-minimal w.r.t. $H = \{a\}$ that yields the MH model $\{a, k\}$.

4.3 Properties

The minimality of H is not sufficient to ensure minimality of $M^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H})$ making its checking explicitly necessary if that is so desired. Minimality of hypotheses is indeed the common practice in science, not the minimality of their inevitable consequences. To the contrary, the more of these the better because it signifies a greater predictive power.

In Logic Programming model minimality is a consequence of definitions: the T operator in definite programs is conducive to defining a least fixed point, a unique minimal model semantics; in SM, though there may be more than one model, minimality turns out to be a property because of the stability (and its attendant classical support) requirement; in the WFS, again the existence of a least fixed point operator affords a minimal (information) model. In abduction too, minimality of consequences is not a caveat, but rather minimality of hypotheses is, if that even. Hence our approach to LP semantics via MHS is novel indeed, and insisting instead on positive hypotheses establishes an improved and more general link to abduction and argumentation [16, 17].

Theorem 1. *At least one Minimal Hypotheses model of P complies with the Well-Founded Model. Let P be an NLP. Then, there is at least one Minimal Hypotheses model M of P such that $M^+ \supseteq WFM^+(P)$ and $M^+ \subseteq WFM^{+u}(P)$.*

Proof. If $facts(\widehat{P}) = heads(\widehat{P})$ or equivalently, $WFM^u(P) = \emptyset$, then M_H is a MH model of P given that $H = \emptyset$ because $M_H^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup H}) = facts(\widehat{P \cup \emptyset}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup \emptyset}) = facts(\widehat{P}) = heads(\widehat{P})$. On the other hand, if $facts(\widehat{P}) \neq heads(\widehat{P})$, then there is at least one non-empty set-inclusion minimal set of hypotheses $H \subseteq Hyps(P)$ such that $H \supseteq facts(P)$. The corresponding M_H is, by definition, a MH model of P which is guaranteed to comply with $M_H^+ \supseteq WFM^+(P) = facts(\widehat{P})$ and $M_H^- \supseteq not\ WFM^-(P) = not\ (\mathcal{H}_P \setminus M_H^+)$. \square

Theorem 2. Minimal Hypotheses semantics guarantees model existence. *Let P be an NLP. There is always, at least, one Minimal Hypotheses model of P .*

Proof. It is trivial to see that one can always find a set $H \subseteq \text{Hyps}(P)$ such that $M_{H'}^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H'}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H'})$ — in the extreme case, $H' = \text{Hyps}(P)$. From such H' one can always select a minimal subset $H \subset H'$ such that $M_H^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H})$ still holds. \square

4.4 Relevance

Theorem 3. Minimal Hypotheses semantics enjoys Relevance. *Let P be an NLP. Then, by definition 5, it holds that*

$$(\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) a \in M^+) \Leftrightarrow (\forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(\text{Rel}_P(a)) a \in M_a^+)$$

Proof. \Rightarrow : Assume $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) a \in M^+$. Now we need to prove $\forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(\text{Rel}_P(a)) a \in M_a^+$. Assume some $M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(\text{Rel}_P(a))$; now we show that assuming $a \notin M_a^+$ leads to an absurdity. Since M_a is a 2-valued complete model of $\text{Rel}_P(a)$ we know that $|M_a| = \mathcal{H}_{\text{Rel}_P(a)}$ hence, if $a \notin M_a$, then necessarily $\text{not } a \in M_a^-$. Since $P \supseteq \text{Rel}_P(a)$, by theorem 2 we know that there is some model M' of P such that $M' \supseteq M_a$, and thus $\text{not } a \in M'^-$ which contradicts the initial assumption that $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) a \in M^+$. We conclude $a \notin M_a^-$ cannot hold, i.e., $a \in M_a$ must hold. Since $a \in M^+$ hold for every model M of P , then $a \in M_a$ must hold for every model M_a of $\text{Rel}_P(a)$.

\Leftarrow : Assume $\forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(\text{Rel}_P(a)) a \in M_a^+$. Now we need to prove $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) a \in M^+$. Let us write $P_{a\setminus}$ as an abbreviation of $P \setminus \text{Rel}_P(a)$. We have therefore $P = P_{a\setminus} \cup \text{Rel}_P(a)$. Let us now take $P_{a\setminus} \cup M_a$. We know that every NLP as an MH model, hence every MH model M of $P_{a\setminus} \cup M_a$ is such that $M \supseteq M_a$. Let H_{M_a} denote the Hypotheses set of M_a — i.e., $M_a^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{\text{Rel}_P(a) \cup H_{M_a}}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{\text{Rel}_P(a) \cup H_{M_a}})$, with $H_{M_a} = \emptyset$ or non-empty set-inclusion minimal, as per definition 20. If $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H_{M_a}}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H_{M_a}})$ then $M^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H_M}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H_M})$ is an MH model of P with $H_M = H_{M_a}$ and, necessarily, $M \supseteq M_a$.

If $\text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H_{M_a}}) \neq \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H_{M_a}})$ then, knowing that every program has a MH model, we can always find an MH model M of $P_{a\setminus} \cup M_a$, with $H' \subseteq \text{Hyps}(P_{a\setminus} \cup M_a)$, where $M^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H'}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H'})$. Such M is thus $M^+ = \text{facts}(\widehat{P \cup H_M}) = \text{heads}(\widehat{P \cup H_M})$ where $H_M = H_{M_a} \cup H'$, which means M is a MH model of P with $M \supseteq M_a$. Since every model M_a of $\text{Rel}_P(a)$ is such that $a \in M_a^+$, then every model M of P must also be such that $a \in M$. \square

4.5 Cumulativity

MH semantics enjoys Cumulativity thus allowing for lemma storing techniques to be used during computation of answers to queries.

Theorem 4. Minimal Hypotheses semantics enjoys Cumulativity. *Let P be an NLP. Then*

$$\forall a, b \in \mathcal{H}_P ((\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) a \in M^+) \Rightarrow (\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) b \in M^+ \Leftrightarrow \forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P \cup \{a\}) b \in M_a^+))$$

Proof. Assume $\forall_{\substack{a \in \mathcal{H}_P \\ M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P)}} a \in M^+$.

\Rightarrow : Assume $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) b \in M^+$. Since every MH model M contains a it follows that all such M are also MH models of $P \cup \{a\}$. Since we assumed $b \in M$ as well, and we know that M is a MH model of $P \cup \{a\}$ we conclude b is also in those MH models M of $P \cup \{a\}$. By adding a as a fact we have necessarily $\text{Hyps}(P \cup \{a\}) \subseteq \text{Hyps}(P)$ which means that there cannot be more MH models for $P \cup \{a\}$ than for P . Since we already know that for every MH model M of P , M is also a MH model of $P \cup \{a\}$ we must conclude that $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) \exists! M' \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P \cup \{a\})$ such that $M'^+ \supseteq M^+$. Since $\forall M \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P) b \in M^+$ we necessarily conclude $\forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P \cup \{a\}) b \in M_a^+$.

\Leftarrow : Assume $\forall M_a \in \text{Models}_{MH}(P \cup \{a\}) b \in M_a^+$. Since the MH semantics is relevant (theorem 3) if b does not depend on a then adding a as a fact to P or not has no impact on b 's truth-value, and if $b \in M_a^+$ then

$b \in M^+$ as well. If b does depend on a , which is true in every MH model M of P , then either 1) b depends positively on a , and in this case since $a \in M$ then $b \in M$ as well; or 2) b depends negatively on a , and in this case the lack of a as a fact in P can only contribute, if at all, to make b true in M as well. Then we conclude $\forall_{M \in Models_{MH}(P)} b \in M^+$. \square

4.6 Complexity

The complexity issues usually relate to a particular set of tasks, namely: 1) knowing if the program has a model; 2) if it has any model entailing some set of ground literals (a query); 3) if all models entail a set of literals. In the case of MH semantics, the answer to the first question is an immediate “yes” because MH semantics guarantees model existence for NLPs; the second and third questions correspond (respectively) to Brave and Cautious Reasoning, which we now analyse.

Brave Reasoning The complexity of the Brave Reasoning task with MH semantics, i.e., finding an MH model satisfying some particular set of literals is Σ_2^P -complete.

Theorem 5. Brave Reasoning with MH semantics is Σ_2^P -complete. *Let P be an NLP, and Q a set of literals, or query. Finding an MH model such that $M \supseteq Q$ is a Σ_2^P -complete task.*

Proof. To show that finding a MH model $M \supseteq Q$ is Σ_2^P -complete, note that a nondeterministic Turing machine with access to an NP-complete oracle can solve the problem as follows: nondeterministically guess a set H of hypotheses (i.e., a subset of $Hyps(P)$). It remains to check if H is empty or non-empty minimal such that $M^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup H})$ and $M \supseteq Q$. Checking that $M^+ = facts(\widehat{P \cup H}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup H})$ can be done in polynomial time (because computing $\widehat{P \cup H}$ can be done in polynomial time [2] for whichever $P \cup H$), and checking H is empty or non-empty minimal requires a nondeterministic guess of a strict subset H' of H and then a polynomial check if $facts(\widehat{P \cup H'}) = heads(\widehat{P \cup H'})$. \square

Cautious Reasoning Conversely, the Cautious Reasoning, i.e., guaranteeing that every MH model satisfies some particular set of literals, is Π_2^P -complete.

Theorem 6. Cautious Reasoning with MH semantics is Π_2^P -complete. *Let P be an NLP, and Q a set of literals, or query. Guaranteeing that all MH models are such that $M \supseteq Q$ is a Π_2^P -complete task.*

Proof. Cautious Reasoning is the complement of Brave Reasoning, and since the latter is Σ_2^P -complete (theorem 5), the former must necessarily be Π_2^P -complete. \square

The set of hypotheses $Hyps(P)$ is obtained from \dot{P} which identifies rules that depend on themselves. The hypotheses are the atoms of DNLs of \dot{P} , i.e., the “atoms of *nots* in loop”. A Minimal Hypotheses model is then obtained from a minimal set of these hypotheses sufficient to determine the 2-valued truth-value of every literal in the program. The MH semantics imposes no ordering or preference between hypotheses — only their set-inclusion minimality. For this reason, we can think of the choosing of a set of hypotheses yielding a MH model as finding a minimal solution to a disjunction problem, where the disjuncts are the hypotheses. In this sense, it is therefore understandable that the complexity of the reasoning tasks with MH semantics is in line with that of, e.g., reasoning tasks with SM semantics with Disjunctive Logic Programs, i.e., Σ_2^P -complete and Π_2^P -complete.

In abductive reasoning (as well as in Belief Revision) one does not always require minimal solutions. Likewise, taking a hypotheses assumption based semantic approach, like the one of MH, one may not require minimality of assumed hypotheses. In such case, we would be under a non-Minimal Hypotheses semantics, and the complexity classes of the corresponding reasoning task would be one level down in the Polynomial Hierarchy relatively to the MH semantics, i.e., Brave Reasoning with a non-Minimal Hypotheses semantics would be NP-complete, and Cautious Reasoning would be coNP-complete. We leave the exploration of such possibilities for future work.

4.7 Comparisons

As we have seen all stable models are MH models. Since MH models are always guaranteed to exist for every NLP (cf. theorem 2) and SMs are not, it follows immediately that the Minimal Hypotheses semantics is a strict model conservative generalization of the Stable Models semantics. The MH models that are stable models are exactly those in which all rules are classically supported. With this criterion one can conclude whether some program does not have any stable models. For Normal Logic Programs, the Stable Models semantics coincides with the Answer-Set semantics (which is a generalization of SMs to Extended Logic Programs), where the latter is known (cf. [10]) to correspond to Reiter’s default logic. Hence, all Reiter’s default extensions have a corresponding Minimal Hypotheses model. Also, since Moore’s expansions of an autoepistemic theory [13] are known to have a one-to-one correspondence with the stable models of the NLP version of the theory, we conclude that for every such expansion there is a matching Minimal Hypotheses model for the same NLP.

Disjunctive Logic Programs (DisjLPs — allowing for disjunctions in the heads of rules) can be syntactically transformed into NLPs by applying the Shifting Rule presented in [6] in all possible ways. By non-deterministically applying such transformation in all possible ways, several SCCs of rules may appear in the resulting NLP that were not present in the original DisjLP — assigning a meaning to every such SCC is a distinctive feature of MH semantics, unlike other semantics such as the SMs. This way, the MH semantics can be defined for DisjLPs as well: the MH models of a DisjLP are the MH models of the NLP resulting from the transformation via Shifting Rule.

There are other kinds of disjunction, like the one in logic programs with ordered disjunction (LPOD) [3]. These employ “*a new connective called ordered disjunction. The new connective allows to represent alternative, ranked options for problem solutions in the heads of rules*”. As the author of [3] says “the semantics of logic programs with ordered disjunction is based on a preference relation on answer sets.” This is different from the semantics assigned by MH since the latter includes no ordering, nor preferences, in the assumed minimal sets of hypotheses. E.g., in example 1 there is no notion of preference or ordering amongst candidate models — LPODs would not be the appropriate formalism for such cases. We leave for future work a thorough comparison of these approaches, namely comparing the semantics of LPODs against the MH models of LPODs transformed into NLPs (via the Shifting Rule).

The motivation for [21] is similar to our own — to assign a semantics to *every* NLP — however their approach is different from ours in the sense that the methods in [21] resort to contrapositive rules allowing any positive literal in the head to be shifted (by negating it) to the body or any negative literal in the body to be shifted to the head (by making it positive). This approach considers each rule as a disjunction making no distinction between such literals occurring in the rule, whether or not they are in loop with the head of the rule. This permits the shifting operations in [21] to create support for atoms that have no rules in the original program. E.g.

Example 6. Nearly-Stable Models vs MH models. Take the program $P =$

$$\begin{aligned} a &\leftarrow \text{not } b \\ b &\leftarrow \text{not } c \\ c &\leftarrow \text{not } a, \text{not } x \end{aligned}$$

According to the shifting operations in [21] this program could be transformed into $P' =$

$$\begin{aligned} b &\leftarrow \text{not } a \\ b &\leftarrow \text{not } c \\ x &\leftarrow \text{not } a, \text{not } c \end{aligned}$$

by shifting a and $\text{not } b$ in the first rule, and shifting the $\text{not } x$ to the head (becoming positive x) and c to the body (becoming negative $\text{not } c$) of the third rule thus allowing for $\{b, x\}$ (which is a stable model of P') to be a *nearly stable model* of P . In this sense the approach of [21] allows for the violation of the Closed-World Assumption. This does not happen with our approach: $\{b, x\}$ is not a Minimal Hypotheses model simply because since x has no rules in P it cannot be true in any MH model — $\text{not } x$ is not a member of $Hyps(P)$ (cf. def. 18).

As shown in theorem 1, at least one MH model of a program complies with its well-founded model, although not necessarily all MH models do. E.g., the program in Ex. 2 has the two MH models $\{beach, mountain, not\ travel\}$ and $\{beach, not\ mountain, travel\}$, whereas the $WFM(P)$ imposes $WFM^+(P) = \{beach, mountain\}$, $WFM^u(P) = \emptyset$, and $WFM^-(P) = \{travel\}$. This is due to the set of Hypotheses $Hyps(P)$ of P being taken from \hat{P} (based on the layered support notion) instead of being taken from \hat{P} (based on the classical notion of support).

Not all Minimal Hypotheses models are Minimal Models of a program. The rationale behind MH semantics is minimality of hypotheses, but not necessarily minimality of consequences, the latter being enforceable, if so desired, as an additional requirement, although at the expense of increased complexity.

The relation between logic programs and argumentation systems has been considered for a long time now ([7] amongst many others) and we have also taken steps to understand and further that relationship [16–18]. Dung’s Preferred Extensions [7] are maximal sets of negative hypotheses yielding consistent models. Preferred Extensions, however, these are not guaranteed to always yield 2-valued complete models. Our previous approaches [16, 17] to argumentation have already addressed the issue of 2-valued model existence guarantee, and the MH semantics also solves that problem by virtue of positive, instead of negative, hypotheses assumption.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

Taking a positive hypotheses assumption approach we defined the 2-valued Minimal Hypotheses semantics for NLPs that guarantees model existence, enjoys relevance and cumulativity, and is also a model conservative generalization of the SM semantics. Also, by adopting positive hypotheses, we not only generalized the argumentation based approach of [7], but the resulting MH semantics lends itself naturally to abductive reasoning, it being understood as hypothesizing plausible reasons sufficient for justifying given observations or supporting desired goals. We also defined the layered support notion which generalizes the classical one by recognizing the special role of loops.

For query answering, the MH semantics provides mainly three advantages over the SMs: 1) by enjoying Relevance top-down query-solving is possible, thereby circumventing whole model computation (and grounding) which is unavoidable with SMs; 2) by considering only the relevant sub-part of the program when answering a query it is possible to enact grounding of only those rules, if grounding is really desired, whereas with SM semantics whole program grounding is, once again, inevitable — grounding is known to be a major source of computational time consumption; MH semantics, by enjoying Relevance, permits curbing this task to the minimum sufficient to answer a query; 3) by enjoying Cumulativity, as soon as the truth-value of a literal is determined in a branch for the top query it can be stored in a table and its value used to speed up the computations of other branches within the same top query.

Goal-driven abductive reasoning is elegantly modelled by top-down abductive-query-solving. By taking a hypotheses assumption approach, enjoying Relevance, MH semantics caters well for this convenient problem representation and reasoning category.

Many applications have been developed using the Stable Model/Answer-set semantics as the underlying platform. These generally tend to be focused on solving problems that require complete knowledge, such as search problems where all the knowledge represented is relevant to the solutions. However, as Knowledge Bases increase in size and complexity, and as merging and updating of KBs becomes more and more common, e.g. for Semantic Web applications, [11], partial knowledge problem solving importance grows, as the need to ensure overall consistency of the merged/updated KBs.

The Minimal Hypotheses semantics is intended to, and can be used in *all* the applications where the Stable Models/Answer-Sets semantics are themselves used to model KRR and search problems, *plus* all applications where query answering (both under a credulous mode of reasoning and under a skeptical one) is intended, *plus* all applications where abductive reasoning is needed. The MH semantics aims to be a sound theoretical platform for 2-valued (possibly abductive) reasoning with logic programs.

Much work still remains to be done that can be rooted in this platform contribution. The general topics of using non-normal logic programs (allowing for negation, default and/or explicit, in the heads of rules) for Belief Revision, Updates, Preferences, etc., are *per se* orthogonal to the semantics issue, and therefore, all these subjects can now be addressed with Minimal Hypotheses semantics as the underlying platform.

Importantly, MH can guarantee the liveness of updated and self-updating LP programs such as those of EVOLP [1] and related applications. The Minimal Hypotheses semantics still has to be thoroughly compared with Revised Stable Models [15], PStable Models [14], and other related semantics.

In summary, we have provided a fresh platform on which to re-examine ever present issues in Logic Programming and its uses, which purports to provide a natural continuation and improvement of LP development.

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