Physical-layer Security Against Non-degraded Eavesdroppers

Authors

Abstract

Most of current physical-layer security techniques rely on a degraded eavesdropper, thus warranting some sort of advantage that can be relied upon to achieve higher levels of security. We consider instead non-degraded eavesdroppers, that possess equal or better capabilities than legitimate receivers. Under this challenging setup, most of current physical-layer security techniques become hard to administer and new dimensions to establish advantageous periods of communication are needed. For that, we characterize the secrecy level of two schemes for physical-layer security under non-degraded eavesdroppers: a spread spectrum uncoordinated frequency hopping scheme, and a jamming receiver with self-interference cancellation.

Subject

wireless, security

Related Project

WINCE -- Wireless INterference and Coding for sEcrecy

Conference

IEEE Global Communications Conference, December 2015

DOI